Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 39 | Issue 2

Article 6

2014

Apple vs. Android: Global Software Patentatbility
and the Mobile OS Wars
Matthew Lammertse

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
Recommended Citation
Matthew Lammertse, Apple vs. Android: Global Software Patentatbility and the Mobile OS Wars, 39 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2014).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol39/iss2/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

APPLE VS. ANDROID: GLOBAL
SOFTWARE PATENTABILITY AND THE
MOBILE OS WARS
INTRODUCTION

O

n Friday, August 24, 2012, a jury in San Jose, California
awarded Apple, Inc. (“Apple”) a jury verdict exceeding
one billion dollars in its patent infringement suit against Samsung Electronics Company (“Samsung”).1 The verdict was the
third-largest jury award ever seen in U.S. patent litigation.2
The impact of the trial reverberated well beyond the immediate
damages award; the Monday following the verdict, Samsung’s
stock price dropped by 7.5%, representing a loss of approximately twelve billion dollars in market value.3 The technology
press closely followed the trial and dubbed it the “Patent Trial
of the Century.”4 The outsize verdict echoed throughout the industry and in the future may encourage timidity in smartphone
design choices by Apple’s competitors in an industry that has

1. Nick Wingfield, Jury Awards $1 Billion to Apple in Samsung Patent
TIMES
(Aug.
24,
2012),
Case,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/technology/jury-reaches-decision-inapple-samsung-patent-trial.html. After a retrial on damages ordered by
Judge Lucy Koh, Apple’s total liability stands at $929.8 million. Gerry Shih,
U.S. Jury Awards Apple $290 Million in Retrial Against Samsung, REUTERS
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/21/us-apple-samsungverdict-idUSBRE9AK19V20131121. This verdict is still subject to adjustment
by Judge Koh. Florian Mueller, Retrial Jury Awards Apple $290 Million, Total Damages in Case Against Samsung: $929 Million, FOSS PATENTS (Nov.
21, 2013), http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/11/retrial-jury-awards-apple-290million.html.
2. Cromwell Schubarth, Apple’s $1B Patent Win Is Third Biggest in U.S.,
PDT),
SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (Aug. 25, 2012, 9:27 AM
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2012/08/25/apples-1b-patent-win-isthird.html.
3. Miyoung Kim, Samsung Shares Drop $12 Billion after Apple’s Court
(Aug.
27,
2012),
Victory,
REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/27/us-samsung-sharesidUSBRE87Q00120120827.
4. See, e.g., Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Apple v. Samsung: The Patent Trial of
(July
30,
2012),
the
Century
Starts
Today,
FORTUNE
http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/07/30/apple-v-samsung-the-patent-trial-ofthe-century-starts-today.
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coalesced around similar styles.5 While the sheer size of the
verdict has captured the attention of the media, the San Jose
trial represents just one of Apple’s plays in an elaborate, global
litigation strategy including over fifty lawsuits spanning across
ten countries.6
The patent dispute between Apple and Samsung has rightly
been viewed as one battle in a larger proxy war between Apple
and another industry giant, Google.7 The two companies are
jockeying for control over the mobile operating system (“OS”)
industry, and their respective mobile operating systems, iOS
and Android,8 are currently the top two mobile operating sys-

5. Brian X. Chen & Lisa Alcalay Klug, A Verdict That Alters an Industry,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/technology/averdict-that-alters-an-industry.html.
6. In addition to the United States, Apple has sued Samsung in Germany,
the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, South Korea,
Japan, and Australia. Florian Mueller, List of 50+ Apple-Samsung Lawsuits
PATENTS
(Apr.
28,
2012),
in
10
Countries,
FOSS
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/04/list-of-50-apple-samsung-lawsuits-in10.html. Apple has also been involved in patent litigation against Motorola
over Motorola’s use of the Android operating system in multiple United
States District Courts, the International Trade Commission (“ITC”), and in
Germany. Florian Mueller, Updated Lists of Android Patent Infringement
Findings and Successful Countersuits, FOSS PATENTS (Oct. 12, 2012),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/10/updated-lists-of-android-patent.html.
Additionally, Apple and smartphone manufacturer HTC were engaged in
litigation in both the ITC and the U.K. Chloe Albanesius, HTC Secures Patent Win Against Apple in U.K., PC MAG (July 5, 2012, 11:43 AM),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2406730,00.asp. Apple and HTC have
since settled all of their patent disputes pursuant to a ten-year licensing
agreement. Ian Sherr, Apple, HTC Settle Patent Dispute, Sign Licensing Pact,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Nov.
11,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324894104578111792346747
174.html.
7. Alexei Orekovic & Poornima Gupta, Exclusive: Google, Apple CEOs in
(Aug.
30,
2012),
Secret
Patent
Talks,
REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/30/us-google-appleidUSBRE87T15H20120830.
8. Many consumers frequently confuse the Android software with the
computing devices that utilize it. Android is an operating system developed
by Google that is then licensed to manufacturers like Samsung. Marziah
Karch,
What
Is
Google
Android?,
ABOUT.COM,
http://google.about.com/od/socialtoolsfromgoogle/p/android_what_is.htm (last
visited Jan. 20, 2013).
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tems by a large margin.9 iOS and Android currently enjoy respective market shares of 14.9% and 75%, while the next most
successful competitor, BlackBerry, controls only 4.3% of the
market.10 Apple’s co-founder, Steve Jobs, famously told his biographer Walter Isaacson that he viewed Android as a “stolen
product” and vowed to wage a “thermonuclear war” against
Google for its release.11 However, rather than attacking Google
directly, Apple has elected to sue companies that use Android
in products that currently compete with Apple’s iPhone and
iPad.12 Apple has yet to sue Google itself, instead targeting a
number of consumer electronics manufacturers that sell devices running Android, including Samsung, HTC Corp. (“HTC”),
and Motorola.13 Some commentators speculate that this is because Google distributes Android free of cost under an opensource license, and therefore does not directly profit from Android, making damages much more difficult for Apple to
prove.14 Nonetheless, a series of courtroom victories against
manufacturers that use Android may encourage Apple to target
Google, because some of Apple’s patent claims implicate features that are found in the core Android operating system.15
9. Jessica E. Vascellaro & Amir Efrati, Google, Apple Tighten Grip on
Smartphone
Market,
WALL
ST.
J.
(June
18,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303379204577474794114369
320.html. Combined, iOS and Android lead the next competitor, BlackBerry,
by over 85% of the total market share. Dara Kerr, Android Beats iOS 5-to-1
in
Q3
Smartphone
Market
Share,
CNET
(Nov.
1,
2012),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-57544131-94/android-beats-ios-5-to-1-inq3-smartphone-market-share.
10. Kerr, supra note 9.
11. Connie Guglielmo, Apple Analysts Call Verdict an Important Victory in
‘Thermonuclear War’ with Google Android, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2012, 1:59 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/connieguglielmo/2012/08/27/apple-analysts-callverdict-an-important-victory-in-thermonuclear-war-with-google-android/.
12. Claire Cain Miller & Brian X. Chen, Samsung Case Puts Apple Closer
TIMES
(Aug.
28,
2012),
to
Google
Fight,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/technology/samsung-case-puts-applecloser-to-fight-with-google.html.
13. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Will Apple Now Sue Google?, FORTUNE (Aug. 25,
2012, 7:58 PM EDT), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/08/25/will-apple-nowsue-google.
14. Miller & Chen, supra note 12.
15. Most of Apple’s infringement claims against Samsung arose from its
TouchWiz “skin,” a software modification that changes the appearance of the
operating system. Ryan Whitwam, How the Apple-Samsung Case Could Push
OEMs Closer to Google and Stock Android, EXTREME TECH (Aug. 28, 2012,
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This patent dispute comes at a time when many in the technology industry are becoming skeptical about the usefulness of
software patents in fostering innovation.16 One of the more vocal critics is U.S. Circuit Judge Richard Posner.17 Judge Posner
elected to preside over the Apple v. Motorola litigation in the
Northern District of Illinois in the summer of 2012.18 Despite
finding that the patents were valid and infringed, Judge Posner cancelled the jury trial and dismissed the case because, in
his opinion, neither party could prove damages nor “establish a
right to relief.”19 In an interview, Judge Posner questioned
whether patents are necessary in the software industry—
without patents, innovative software companies would still receive the benefit of being first to market.20 He also expressed
10:01 AM), http://www.extremetech.com/computing/135108-how-the-applesamsung-case-could-push-oems-closer-to-google-and-stock-android. However,
some of Apple’s patents, including the patent for distinguishing between single and multiple finger touches on a touchscreen, are built into the stock version of Android developed by Google. These features could eventually lead to
patent claims by Apple against Google itself. Miller & Chen, supra note 12.
16. Michael J. Miller, Software Patents Mean More Litigation, Less InnoMAG
(Aug.
28,
2012,
5:13
PM
EST),
vation,
PC
http://forwardthinking.pcmag.com/none/302064-software-patents-mean-morelitigation-less-innovation.
17. Michael Hiltzik, Blame a Dysfunctional Patent System for the Apple vs.
TIMES
(Aug.
28,
2012),
Samsung
Verdict,
L.A.
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/28/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20120828.
18. Dan Levine, Judge Who Shelved Apple Trial Says Patent System out of
Sync, REUTERS (Jul. 5, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/usapple-google-judge-idUSBRE8640IQ20120705.
19. Order of June 7, 2012 at 1, Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv08540 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2012).
20. Levine, supra note 18. Being the “first-mover” is generally considered
to confer a competitive advantage on the first company to market a type of
product or enter a certain market. See First Mover, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/firstmover.asp (last visited Nov. 17,
2013). Some question whether software patents are necessary in light of how
quickly software markets develop, arguing that the first-mover advantage is
sufficient incentive to encourage innovation. See Brian J. Love, No: Software
Patents Don’t Spur Innovation, but Impede It, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873233354045784446838
87043510 (arguing that new market entrants in the software field focus on
innovation rather than obtaining patent protection for their ideas). Under
this view, software patents impose high costs on innovation because they are
typically obtained by incumbent firms rather than new market entrants and
enormous amounts of money that could be spent on research in development
is instead spent on obtaining and litigating patents. Id.
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concern that companies are using software patents to stifle
competition.21 It is common industry practice to acquire massive patent portfolios in order to defend against litigation, almost a legal version of the mutually assured destruction paradigm seen during the Cold War.22 Indeed, Google stated that it
purchased Motorola Mobility merely to acquire Motorola’s impressive portfolio of approximately 17,000 patents.23 The iOS
and Android patent dispute therefore serves as a useful case
study for the effects on a global industry when a powerful player decides to aggressively litigate its patents and seek an injunction in courts rather than negotiating a licensing agreement.24
One common thread connecting the lawsuits in the global
Apple-Android legal battle is the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs Agreement” or
“TRIPs”).25 Signed in 1994, the TRIPs Agreement attempted to
harmonize global intellectual property (“IP”) law by requiring a
minimum level of IP protection of its signatory countries.26 The
21. Levine, supra note 18.
22. Just as superpowers obtained massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons
during the Cold War to deter against nuclear attack, today technology companies hoard software patents as a strategy to deter high-stakes patent lawsuits. See Alex Blumberg & Laura Sydell, When Patents Attack, NPR (Jul. 26,
2011, 8:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/07/26/138576167/whenpatents-attack.
23. Jacob Goldstein, Google Escalates the Patent Arms Race, NPR (Aug. 15,
2011,
12:08
PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/08/15/139639032/google-escalatespatent-arms-race.
24. Although Apple has offered a licensing arrangement to Samsung, Boris
Teskler, Director of Patent Licensing Strategy at Apple, testified at trial that
Apple is not interested in licensing certain patents relating to iOS’s user interface (“UI”) to Samsung. See Megan Geuss, Apple v. Samsung: Apple Says
It Has No Interest in Licensing Its Patents, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 10, 2012, 9:05
PM EDT), http://arstechnica.com/apple/2012/08/apple-v-samsung-apple-hasno-interest-in-licensing-its-patents.
25. TRIPs is central to the Apple-Android patent dispute because it articulated a global standard for what types of inventions are patentable. See
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement].
26. Adam Isaac Hason, Domestic Implementation of International Obligations: The Quest for World Patent Harmonization, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 373, 376 (2002).
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TRIPs Agreement applies to all members of the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”).27 The two forum countries discussed in
this paper, the United States and the United Kingdom, are
both members of the WTO and are therefore signatories to the
TRIPs Agreement.28 Since the WTO has 159 member countries,
TRIPs has an extremely broad base.29 Given such wide adherence, TRIPs is an excellent starting point for discussing potential changes to international patent law.
Several aspects of the TRIPs Agreement are relevant to software patents. First, some groups contest whether TRIPs even
requires patent protection for software in the first place.30 Second, TRIPs requires signatory countries to issue patents for a
minimum of twenty years, and the twenty-year term applies
regardless of subject matter or technological field.31 Third,
TRIPs mandates that its signatory countries offer injunctive
relief as a remedy for patent infringement.32 Given the rapid
rise and fleeting market life of consumer electronics globally,
the TRIPs Agreement should be updated to reduce the minimum patent period for software applications from twenty years
to five years, and provide for a specific definition under Article
27 of what constitutes an “inventive step . . . capable of industrial application,”33 which would streamline international pa27. Kelvin W. Willoughby, How Much Does Technology Really Matter in
Patent Law? A Comparative Analysis of Doctrines of Appropriate Patentable
Subject Matter in American and European Patent Law, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 63,
77 (2008).
28. Understanding the WTO: The Organization—Members and Observers,
TRADE
ORG.
(Mar.
2,
2013),
WORLD
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
29. Id.
30. Article 10 of the TRIPs Agreement states that software is to be afforded protection under the Berne Convention, which provides for copyright protection. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 25, art. 10. Additionally, TRIPs
does not specifically require patents in any particular field, but rather “inventions . . . in all fields of technology.” Id. art. 27.
31. Id. art. 27.
32. Id. art. 29.
33. Under the TRIPs Agreement, an invention must be “new, involve an
inventive step and [be] capable of industrial application” in order to be patentable. Id. art. 27. These requirements have led to uncertainty and generated differing views on what types of software are patentable under the treaty. See Charles R. McManis, Taking TRIPs on the Information Superhighway:
International Intellectual Property Protection and Emerging Computer Technology, 41 VILL. L. REV. 207, 247–48 (1996).
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tent litigation, reduce litigation costs for both patent holders
and patent-issuing countries, and reduce industry reliance on
high-volume but low-quality patent portfolios as a primary patent strategy.34
Part I of this paper will provide background on the significance of the Apple-Android patent dispute, as well as an overview of two recent cases, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.
in the United States, and HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc. in
the United Kingdom. Part II will discuss how TRIPs has impacted patent law globally and provide an overview of software
patentability in the United States and the U.K. Part III will
analyze how TRIPs fails to provide guidance on software patentability by analyzing the results of the Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. LTD and HTC v. Apple Inc. cases. Finally,
Part IV will discuss potential modifications to the TRIPs
Agreement that would provide for increased competition in the
fields of software and consumer electronics.
I. BACKGROUND
The Apple-Android patent dispute comes as the computing
industry is shifting from desktops and laptops to mobile devices, providing an opportunity for companies to cement themselves as key players in an emerging market.35 This section will
discuss the significance of the patent disputes in light of these
changes, and provide an overview of how the dispute is playing
out in U.S. and U.K. courts.
A. The Significance of the Apple-Android Patent Dispute
The ultimate outcome of this global patent battle will have a
profound effect on the landscape of mobile computing for years
to come.36 Shipments of new smartphones have surpassed
shipments of new personal computers.37 Apple capitalized on
34. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 42 (2005).
35. Claire Cain Miller, In Mobile World, Tech Giants Scramble to Get Up
TIMES
(Oct.
22,
2012),
to
Speed,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/23/technology/in-mobile-world-tech-giantsstruggle-to-get-up-to-speed.html.
36. Chen & Klug, supra note 5.
37. Chloe Albanesius, Smartphone Shipments Surpass PCs for First Time.
MAGAZINE
(Feb.
8,
2011,
12:53
PM),
What’s
Next?,
PC
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2379665,00.asp. This trend is particu-
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this trend with its iPhone and iPad, the prolific sales of which
vaulted Apple to the position of the wealthiest company in the
world by market capitalization, overtaking even the oil giant
Exxon-Mobil.38 Whoever ultimately wins the battle for mobile
operating system market share will reap both huge profits and
tremendous control over the fastest-growing sector in computing.39
To understand the tremendous implications of this patent
dispute, one need not look further than the operating system
war that Apple and Microsoft waged during the 1980s and
1990s.40 The results of this battle are clear: approximately 90%
of the world’s personal computers currently run some version of
Windows.41 The two companies took very different approaches
to computing, with Apple designing both hardware and software as one package, and Microsoft designing software to license to its hardware partners.42 In this sense, iOS is very
much like the original MacIntosh (“Mac”), a closed system designed top to bottom by Apple, while Android resembles Windows as a platform that can be licensed for use on an array of
larly true in developing countries, where low-cost mobile devices have become
the primary means of accessing the Internet for over 50% of smartphone users. New Internet Audience Emerges in Developing Countries, ON DEVICE
RESEARCH (Mar. 15, 2011, 10:05), http://ondeviceresearch.com/blog/newinternet-audience-emerges-in—developing-countries. This is partially due to
the fact that the lower price of smartphones provides a lower barrier to entry
to Internet access. See Mobile Devices on the Rise: Their Impact on our Lives
and on Networks, ITU NEWS (Apr. 2011), https://itunews.itu.int/en/533Mobile-devices-on-the-rise.note.aspx.
38. Adam Satariano, Apple Overtakes Exxon Becoming World’s Most Valu(Aug.
10,
2011),
able
Company,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-09/apple-rises-from-nearbankruptcy-to-become-most-valuable-company.html.
39. See Peter Burrows, Apple vs. Google, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan.
14,
2010),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_04/b4164028483414.htm.
40. See Daniel Eran Dilger, iPhone Patent Wars: Apple’s $1.1 Billion ARM
Injection Ignites a Mobile Patent Race, APPLE INSIDER (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/08/12/iphone-patent-wars-apples-11billion-arm-injection-ignites-a-mobile-patent-race.
41. Desktop Operating System Market Share, NETMARKETSHARE,
http://www.netmarketshare.com/operating-system-marketshare.aspx?qprid=10&qpcustomd=0 (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
42. Scott Martin et al., Microsoft Unveils Surface Tablets, USA TODAY
(Jun.
18,
2012),
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-0618/microsoft-surface-tablet/55676790/1.
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different hardware. Steve Jobs was furious when he discovered
that after Bill Gates visited Apple’s campus, Microsoft intended
to design an operating system with a graphical user interface
that would compete with the Mac,43 an idea that Apple allegedly took from Xerox.44 Apple is surely mindful of another operating system war, as Android’s market share skyrocketed shortly
after its release.45 As Android trends toward similar dominance, reminiscent of Windows, a large patent award could
benefit Apple through licensing fees or an outright injunction.46
Even if Apple cannot attain injunctions in this round of lawsuits, Apple could demand licensing fees from manufacturers
using the “free” Android operating system,47 eating into their
profits and making Android a less attractive option compared
to other alternatives.48
43. Lee Moran, Revealed: The Dinner with a Microsoft Employee That Irritated Steve Jobs So Much He Created the iPad, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2053242/Steve-Jobs-iPad-ideaoriginated-dinner-Microsoft-employee-irritated-him.html.
44. Lawrence M. Fisher, COMPANY NEWS; Xerox Sues Apple Computer
TIMES
(Dec.
15,
1989),
over
Macintosh
Copyright,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/15/business/company-news-xerox-suesapple-computer-over-macintosh-copyright.html.
45. Google Android Phone Shipments Increase by 886%, BBC NEWS (Aug.
2, 2010), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-10839034.
46. Charles Arthur, Apple to Seek Injunction Against Samsung
(Aug.
25,
2012),
Smartphones
and
Tablets,
GUARDIAN
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/aug/25/apple-samsunginjunction-fine.
47. Although Google currently licenses Android for free, Microsoft has assessed substantial licensing fees against several manufacturers. Over 50% of
Android phones are subject to such agreements with Microsoft. It is estimated that the manufacturer HTC pays Microsoft a royalty of $5 per smartphone
that uses Android. Thus, while Google does not charge for using Android,
using it is not “free,” and additional license fees to Apple would only increase
its cost relative to other alternatives. See Jon Brodkin, Microsoft Collects License Fees on 50% of Android Devices, Tells Google to “Wake up”, ARS
TECHNICA (Oct. 23, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2011/10/microsoft-collects-license-fees-on-50-of-android-devicestells-google-to-wake-up.
48. Apple has demanded licensing fees of up to $30 per device from Samsung, which could dramatically raise the licensing fees associated with Android. Samsung has thus far refused Apple’s offer. See Florian Mueller, What
Apple’s 2010 $30-per-unit Licensing Proposal to Samsung Means for Android
in 2012 and Beyond, FOSS PATENTS (Aug. 11, 2012, 5:01 PM),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/08/what-apples-2010-30-per-unitlicensing.html. HTC has entered into a ten-year licensing agreement with
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B. Analyzing Apple’s Global Patent Lawsuits Through the
TRIPs Agreement in the United States and the United Kingdom
One of the primary treaties addressing substantive patent
law is the TRIPs Agreement, signed in 1994.49 A primary goal
of the TRIPs Agreement was to address the growing issue of
international intellectual property violations due to a lack of
international patent enforcement.50 In order to address these
issues, the TRIPs Agreement sought to establish a baseline of
protection for patents, copyright, and trademark by requiring
its signatory countries to implement a minimum level of IP
protection via statute.51 Some of the provisions implemented to
achieve this goal are a requirement for the patentability of inventions regardless of the field of technology, a twenty-year
minimum patent period, and the ability to enforce patent rights
through the issuance of an injunction.52 The TRIPs Agreement
therefore harmonized international patent law by requiring its
signatories to adopt a minimum level of patent protection.53
However, some major outliers persist; the TRIPs Agreement is
binding on individual member states of the European Union,
but it is not binding on the European Patent Office, which issues patents covering all EU member states.54 This lack of uniformity is best observed in a global patent war such as the recent Apple-Android patent dispute, where courts in different
signatory countries have enforced similar patents in radically
different ways.55

Apple, although the license fee has not been disclosed to the public. Samsung
Files Redacted Copy of Apple-HTC Deal in U.S. Court, REUTERS (Dec. 6,
2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/06/us-apple-samsungidUSBRE8B505Y20121206. A judge has ordered Apple to disclose the terms
of the agreement to Samsung. Id.
49. Hason, supra note 26, at 374.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 376.
52. Id. at 377–78.
53. Id. at 386–87.
54. Id. at 386.
55. As discussed infra in Part III, one of Apple’s U.S. patents was found to
be valid at trial, contributing to the one billion dollar jury verdict, while a
similar European patent was found to be invalid in the U.K. as excluded subject matter.
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1. The United States: A Record Jury Award for Apple
As mentioned above, the Apple v. Samsung trial in California
granted Apple one of the largest patent victories ever seen in
U.S. litigation.56 While a modern smartphone implicates potentially hundreds of thousands of patents,57 Apple asserted only
seven against Samsung.58 Apple alleged that a total of twentyeight Samsung devices infringed upon these patents.59 Of primary importance was U.S. Patent No. 7,844,915 (“the ‘915 patent”), which describes “application programming interfaces for
scrolling operations”60 and covers software that can distinguish
between single-touch scrolling input and multi-touch pinch-tozoom input.61 The jury found that twenty-one Samsung devices
infringed upon the ‘915 patent.62 In total, the jury awarded Apple over one billion dollars for Samsung’s infringements.63 Further, the jury found that Samsung willfully infringed upon six
of Apple’s patents, which could have exposed Samsung to treble
damages.64 While the damages awarded were reduced following
a retrial, Samsung remains liable for almost one billion dollars,

56. Wingfield, supra note 1.
57. The Android Patent War: An Apple Trade Claim Could Bar Imports of
Its
Competitors,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Dec.
5,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204826704577074523539966
352.html.
58. Kent German, Apple v. Samsung: The Infringing Device Scorecard,
CNET NEWS (Aug. 24, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_357500273-37/apple-v-samsung-the-infringing-device-scorecard.
59. Chris Gaylord, Apple vs. Samsung: Who Owns Smart Phones?,
SCI.
MONITOR
(Sept.
13,
2012),
CHRISTIAN
http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/Tech/2012/0913/Apple-vs.-SamsungWho-owns-smart-phones.
60. U.S. Patent No. 7,844,915 (filed Jan. 7, 2007).
61. German, supra note 58.
62. Amended Verdict Form at 3, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,
No. 11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Verdict Form].
63. Wingfield, supra note 1.
64. Lance Whitney, Apple Wants $3B in Damages from Samsung, Says
Report, CNET NEWS (Sept. 19, 2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_357515675-37/apple-wants-$3b-in-damages-from-samsung-says-report. Judge
Koh eventually rejected the jury’s finding of willful infringement and denied
Apple treble damages. Florian Mueller, Judge, Unlike Jury, Finds Samsung’s
Infringement of Apple’s Patents Was not Willful, FOSS PATENTS (Jan. 30,
2013),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/01/judge-overrules-jury-findssamsungs.html.
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and Apple has a renewed opportunity to seek a permanent injunction against infringing Samsung products.65
2. HTC v. Apple in the U.K.: Defeat for Software Patents “As
Such”
In addition to its international legal battle against Samsung,
Apple has also been involved in litigation internationally with
other manufacturers that use Android, including Taiwan-based
HTC Corp.66 HTC’s suit against Apple in the U.K. provides an
important counterpoint to Apple v. Samsung in the United
States because it implicates similar patents.67 HTC filed suit
against Apple in the U.K. on July 29, 2001,68 in two separate
actions to invalidate three of Apple’s European patents.69 When
Apple then sued HTC under a fourth patent, HTC counterclaimed to have that patent invalidated.70 The first patent the
court considered, European Patent No. 2098948, enables “recognizing single and multiple point and touch events in multipoint and multi-touch enabled devices.”71 The court found that
HTC’s devices did not infringe this patent, and further that the
patent was invalid as excluded subject matter.72 The second
patent, European Patent No. 1964022, describes “unlocking a
device by performing gestures on an unlock image.”73 Apple’s

65. Mueller, supra note 1.
66. Aleksi Tzatzev, Apple’s New iPhone Could Put It at the Center of a
“Thermonuclear” Patent War, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 13, 2012, 6:10 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/global-apple-litigation-2012-9.
67. See HTC Defeats Apple in Swipe-to-Unlock Patent Dispute, BBC NEWS
(July 4, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-18709232.
68. Florian Mueller, Apple’s Dispute with HTC Goes Global: HTC Files
Lawsuit in the UK, FOSS PATENTS (Aug. 1, 2011, 8:21 PM),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2011/08/apples-dispute-with-htc-goes-globalhtc.html.
69. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [1].
70. Id.
71. European Patent No. 2098948 (filed Apr. 3, 2009).
72. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [363].
“Excluded subject matter” refers to things that are not considered to be inventions and are therefore excluded from patentability by statute. Avi Freeman, Patentable Subject Matter: The View from Europe, INT’L FREE & OPEN
SOURCE L. REV., Sept. 2011, at 59, 60.
73. European Patent No. 1964022 (filed Nov. 30, 2006). The High Court
opinion incorrectly states the patent number as 2964022. See Florian
Mueller, UK High Court Clears HTC of Infringement of Four Apple Patents—
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claims on this patent were found to be invalid for obviousness,
although the patent was not found to be invalid as excluded
subject matter.74 The third patent, European Patent No.
2059868, covers a user interface design for scrolling through
photographs on small screens.75 The court found that HTC’s
devices did not infringe upon this patent, though it was not invalidated as excluded subject matter.76 The final patent, European Patent No. 1168859, involved the use of a multilingual
keyboard.77 This patent was found to be invalid as obvious in
light of prior art, but was not found to be excluded subject matter.78 The results of HTC v. Apple stand in stark contrast to the
results of Apple v. Samsung in the United States, as HTC was
cleared of all infringement allegations and three out of the four
patents that Apple asserted against HTC were found to be invalid.79
II. THE PATENTABILITY OF SOFTWARE INTERNATIONALLY
As the primary treaty addressing subject matter patentability, TRIPs has the potential to exert great influence on the legal standards that nations apply to software patents. This section will provide an overview of how TRIPs has influenced substantive patent law internationally, as well as the applicable
legal standards that have developed in the United States and
the U.K.
A. The Impact of the TRIPs Agreement on Substantive Patent
Law Globally
The TRIPs Agreement represented a significant change in international patent law by requiring signatory countries to

Business as Usual, FOSS PATENTS (July 4, 2012, 7:03 PM),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/07/uk-high-court-clears-htc-of.html.
74. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [363].
75. European Patent No. 2059868 (filed Aug. 30, 2007).
76. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [363].
77. Mueller, supra note 73.
78. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [363].
79. Aaron Souppouris, UK High Court Rules Three Apple Patents Invalid,
(July
4,
2012,
11:45
AM),
Vindicates
HTC,
VERGE
http://www.theverge.com/2012/7/4/3136922/apple-htc-uk-high-court-patentsinvalid.

806

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 39:2

adopt its requirements into domestic patent law.80 Previous patent law treaties, such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty
(“PCT”), only enacted procedural changes such as global patent
applications.81 TRIPs went one step further by requiring signatory countries to adopt a minimum global standard for IP protection implemented in domestic law.82 The domestic implementation requirement has caused some to describe TRIPs as
“the most ambitious intellectual property convention ever attempted,” as it is difficult to persuade countries to implement
changes to domestic law in order to protect foreign intellectual
property interests.83 This global standard was in some respects
even stricter than the domestic requirements of countries that
already had robust patent protection, and therefore represented a tightening of global patent protection.84 However, the
agreement was signed in 1994, while the software and mobile
devices industries were in relative infancy.
While TRIPs has laid substantial groundwork for global patent harmonization, several of its provisions are quite ambiguous and have led to interpretation issues. For example, it is not
clear that TRIPs even requires patent protection for software,
and this question has been the subject of some debate.85 Article
10 of the TRIPs Agreement provides that “[c]omputer programs, whether in source or object code, shall be protected as
literary works under the Berne Convention (1971).”86 Some ad80. Michael L. Doane, TRIPs and Intellectual Property Protection in an Age
of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 465, 468 (1994).
81. Jay A. Erstling et al., Usefulness Varies by Country: The Utility Requirement of Patent Law in the United States, Europe and Canada, 3 CYBARIS
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 20 (2012).
82. Aaron D. Charfoos, How Far Have We Come, and Where Do We Go
from Here: The Status of Global Computer Software Protection under the
TRIPS Agreement, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 261, 268 (2002).
83. Hasson, supra note 26, at 374.
84. Prior to the TRIPs Agreement, the patent term in the United States
was seventeen years after the date of grant. In the U.K., the term was sixteen
years after the date of filing, and in Germany, it was eighteen years from the
date of filing. By extending the term of patent protection to twenty years,
TRIPs increased the term of patent protection in all three countries. See Michael Guntersdorfer, Software Patent Law: The United States and Europe
Compared, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 6, 29 (2003).
85. See Charfoos, supra note 82, at 263 (discussing the failure of TRIPs to
address whether software is patentable subject matter per se as a weakness
in the treaty).
86. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 25, art. 10.
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vocates of more modest software patent protection have used
this provision to argue that the TRIPs Agreement intended to
protect software under copyright, but not with patent protection.87 Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement, however, provides
that “patents shall be available for any inventions, whether
products or processes in all fields of technology.”88 Proponents
of strong patent protection argue that this provision mandates
that software receive patent protection as a “field of technology.”89 Some scholars argue that these two provisions are in fact
compatible, as patents provide stronger protection than copyright, and the two systems therefore complement one another.90
The ambiguity of whether software patents are required under TRIPs can be seen in disparities in patent law in individual
signatory countries. U.S. courts have held for quite some time,
even prior to the TRIPs Agreement, that software is patentable
subject matter.91 In Europe, however, the European Patent
Convention (“EPC”) explicitly excludes computer programs “as
such” from patentable subject matter.92 Although the European
Patent Office (“EPO”) is not a signatory to the TRIPs Agreement, and therefore is not bound by its terms,93 each individual
87. The TRIPs Treaty and Software Patents: A Copyrightable Field of
Technology?, FOUND. FOR A FREE INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE (Apr. 5, 2010),
http://eupat.ffii.org/stidi/trips.
88. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 25, art. 27.
89. See Willoughby, supra note 27, at 79 (2008) (citing evidence that the
technology requirement of Article 27 was demanded by WTO member states
seeking a broad scope of patentable subject matter).
90. Judith A. Szepesi, Maximizing Protection for Computer Software, 12
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 173, 194 (1996).
91. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187–88 (1981) (holding that an
invention, viewed as a whole, is patentable even if the only novel element is a
mathematical algorithm).
92. Article 52(2)(c) of the European Patent Convention (“EPC”) states that
“programs for computers” are excluded from patentable subject matter. However, this is limited by Article 52(3), which states that computer programs
are only excluded “to the extent to which a . . . patent relates to such subject
matters or activities as such.” Convention on the Grant of European Patents
(European Patent Convention) art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199, 13
I.L.M. 276. Software is considered to be a computer program “as such” if it
“does not have the potential to cause a ‘further technical effect’ which must go
beyond the inherent technical interactions between hardware and software.”
Patents for Software?, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/newsissues/issues/computers/software.html (last updated Aug. 21, 2013). This rather confusing concept will be discussed in greater detail in Part II.C.
93. Hasson, supra note 26, at 386.
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European member state is a signatory to TRIPs as a WTO
member.94 Additionally, patents issued by the EPO apply to EU
member states, although they are subject to interpretation under each member state’s domestic law.95 Decisions of the EPO
can still influence the substantive law of member states. For
example, while U.K. courts are bound to follow their own precedent, EPO decisions are treated as persuasive authority.96
Further, achieving consistent results over an individual patent
case filed in multiple forums is a compelling objective that may
influence the decisions of U.K. courts.97 While both the EPO
and U.K. courts have recognized that software is patentable in
some instances, the view in Europe, and especially the U.K., is
more restrictive than both U.S. common law and a literal reading of the TRIPs Agreement.98 Ambiguity in this area of Article
27 has therefore failed to clarify the threshold question of
whether software is patentable subject matter in the first
place, allowing disparate patentability standards to be adopted
by signatories.
The patentability of software is not the only area of Article 27
that has generated confusion. Article 27 requires that patents
be available in every technological field, “provided that they are
new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial
application.”99 While this requirement has analogies in both
U.S. and European law, the requirements for subject matter
patentability have been subject to intense litigation in both forums.100 This has caused courts on both sides of the Atlantic to
accept and discard a multitude of different tests for patentabil94. Susan J. Marsnik & Robert E. Thomas, Drawing a Line in the Patent
Subject-Matter Sands: Does Europe Provide a Solution to the Software and
Business Method Patent Problem?, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 227, 268
(2011); The European Union and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.ht
m (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
95. Marsnik & Thomas, supra note 94, at 268–69.
96. Id. at 303.
97. Id. at 316.
98. See id. at 320–21 (discussing uncertainty in the patentability of software and business methods in Europe relative to the United States).
99. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 25, art. 27.
100. See generally Marsnik & Thomas, supra note 94 (detailing the development of patent law in the United States and Europe and discussing the
development and rejection of a multitude of tests for subject-matter patentability in both forums).
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ity within a short period of time.101 The European and U.S.
views on the patentability of software have largely converged.102 However, differences remain, as the United States
generally accepts “pure” software patents, while the EPO and
the U.K. still find software programs “as such” to be statutorily
excluded subject matter, requiring “something more” to be patentable.103
B. U.S. Substantive Patent Law after TRIPs
The TRIPs Agreement made several important changes to
substantive patent law in the United States. The Uruguay
Round Agreements Act (“URAA”) codified TRIPs into U.S.
law.104 The most important change brought about by the implementation of TRIPs in the United States was an extension
of the patent term from seventeen years to twenty years.105
While this marked a significant extension for patent terms, the
actual term of a patent filed may be substantially shorter than
twenty years, as patents under the URAA are measured from
the date of filing rather than the date of issue.106 The URAA
also allows for provisional applications, allowing a priority date
that does not count toward the patent term. Furthermore, it
allows for the use of foreign activity to show the date of invention.107 Finally, the URAA expanded the definition of infringement to “offers to sell,” increasing patent protection to include
the marketing of infringing products.108 The URAA thus added
101. See generally id.
102. Guntersdorfer, supra note 84, at 33.
103. Marsnik & Thomas, supra note 94, at 320–21.
104. Karen Tripp & Linda Stokley, Changes in U.S. Patent Law Effected by
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act—The GATT Implementation Legislation,
3 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 315, 316 (1995).
105. Id. at 316–17.
106. Id. It can take over three years for a filed patent to be issued. Average
(Dec.
12,
2011),
Patent
Application
Pendency,
PATENTLYO
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/12/average-patent-applicationpendency.html.
107. Tripp & Stokley, supra note 104, at 319–20 (1995). The use of foreign
materials to show the date of invention is now moot, as the America Invents
Act shifted the United States from a “first to invent” system to a “first to file”
system, bringing U.S. patent filing practices in line with most of the rest of
the world. See Reena Jain, America: Last in Line for First-to-File, COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.stlr.org/2012/04/america-last-inline-for-first-to-file.
108. Tripp & Stokley, supra note 104, at 321.
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modest changes to U.S. patent law, the most significant being
an extension of the patent term.109 The most important changes
to U.S. patent law that contrast with European law occurred in
the courts—where TRIPs provided precious little guidance.
The U.S. Congress has long avoided addressing the issue of
whether software is patentable, leaving the question largely to
federal courts.110 The U.S. Supreme Court first considered
whether software was patentable subject matter in 1972 in the
case Gottschalk v. Benson.111 The Court rejected the claim due
to its excessive breadth.112 However, the Court explicitly stated
that its holding did not preclude the patentability of software
programs, although it did not answer the question of patentability definitively.113 This holding left the door open for courts
to explore the patentability of software in the future.
The Supreme Court again considered the patentability of
software in Diamond v. Diehr.114 That case involved a patent
claim that described using constant temperature measurements to adjust an algorithm in order to determine the precise
time to finish the curing of rubber.115 The majority determined
that the invention in Diehr was patentable because the application of the algorithm created a more efficient method for curing rubber and created an industrial transformation of the sort
that patents were designed to protect.116 Under this test, an
invention involving an algorithm or software would be patentable as long as it provided a novel physical transformation, although this was not a requirement for patentability.117 This
physical transformation test is similar to the test currently
used in the U.K. where “something more” is required for patentability of software.118
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit began to move in the direction of increased patentability for software applications lacking such a physical transformative step.
109. Id. at 316.
110. Marsnik & Thomas, supra note 94, at 247.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 247–48.
113. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
114. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
115. Id. at 178–79.
116. Id. at 178, 187.
117. Marsnik & Thomas, supra note 94, at 251.
118. This “something more” is an elusive concept in U.K. patent law that
generally requires an improvement in a computer’s function. Id. at 321.
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In In re Alappat, the Federal Circuit largely abandoned the
Supreme Court’s physical transformation test with respect to
claims involving software and algorithms.119 The court held
that an invention is not excluded from patentability as an “abstract idea” as long as it provides a “useful, concrete, tangible
result.”120 Additionally, inventions could be implemented solely
on a computer because “a general purpose computer in effect
becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to
perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from
program software.”121
In State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., the
Federal Circuit held that mathematical algorithms are patentable subject matter provided that they are “useful,” in that they
involve a “practical application of an abstract idea.”122 Soon after, in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., the Federal
Circuit rejected the physical transformation test that the Supreme Court had adopted in Diehr.123 The court found that the
physical transformation test “seem[ed] of little value” because
after Diehr and Alappat, the mere use of mathematical algorithms did not preclude patentability unless the invention did
not provide a “useful, concrete and tangible result.”124 After
these two cases, software no longer received special subjectmatter scrutiny, and was patentable if it produced a “useful,
concrete, and tangible result.”125
Following AT&T and State Street, the Supreme Court backpedaled on the Federal Circuit with respect to patentable subject matter.126 In Bliski v. Kappos, the Court considered a business method patent that could protect investors against the
risk of price changes in the energy market.127 In addition to rejecting the Federal Circuit’s physical transformation test, the
119. Id. at 258.
120. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
121. Id. at 1545.
122. State Street Bank v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
123. Marsnik & Thomas, supra note 94, at 260.
124. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns., Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
125. Marsnik & Thomas, supra note 94, at 260.
126. See Bliski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 1321 (2010) (holding that the
“machine-or-transformation” test is not the sole test for patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
127. Id. at 3223.
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Court ruled that the invention was not patentable because it
was an “abstract idea.”128 However, the Court declined to define
what might make a “process” patentable, instead directing the
lower courts to its decisions in Benson, Parker v. Flook, and
Diehr.129 However, this holding increased ambiguity in the
realm of patentable subject matter because the Supreme Court
had never actually answered these questions.130
While subject matter patentability remains ambiguous after
Bilski, a few things are certain. First, software and business
methods remain patentable subject matter, as the Supreme
Court refused the opportunity to categorically exclude them.131
Second, software does not need to be tied to a particular machine or involve a transformation of matter, as the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s reasoning that the machine-ortransformation test is the sole test for patentability.132 The only
restriction that remains is that a software patent cannot be
“too abstract.”133 While this ambiguous, undefined standard
will likely be a thorn in the side of courts and the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) for some time, it is
clear that software remains broadly patentable in the United
States.134
C. U.K. Substantive Patent Law after TRIPs
A survey of substantive patent law in the U.K. demonstrates
that the U.K. treats software patentability quite differently
than the United States, as the U.K. tends to take a much

128. Id. at 3231.
129. Id. In Parker v. Flook, the Supreme Court considered a patent on a
process that calculated an “alarm limit” that would maintain efficiency or
avoid dangerous levels in certain industrial processes. Marsnik & Thomas,
supra note 94, at 248–49. The only novel process in the invention was a
mathematical algorithm, which would by itself be unpatentable. Id. at 249.
The Court declined to rule on the patentability of software, but instead required patent examiners to remove any algorithm from the claimed invention
and determine whether the process as a whole was new and useful. Id.
130. Stephen Pulley, An “Exclusive” Application of an Abstract Idea: Clarification of Patent-Eligible Subject Matter After Bilski v. Kappos, 2011 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1223, 1224 (2011).
131. Id. at 1246.
132. Id. at 1245–46.
133. Id. at 1247.
134. Id. at 1249.
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stricter approach to subject matter exclusions.135 The Patent
Act of 1977 (“U.K. Patent Act”) governs patent law in the
U.K.136 Subject matter exceptions to the statute are covered by
subsections 1(2), 4(A), and 76(A); with subsection 1(2) covering
“as such” exclusions of the type used to find one of Apple’s multi-touch patents invalid in the HTC v. Apple case.137 Subsection
1(2) of the U.K. Patent Act explicitly lists “a program for a
computer” as one of the subject matter areas excluded by the
statute “as such.”138 The U.K. patent statute therefore has
more categorical subject matter exclusions and a specific exclusion for computer software compared to patent legislation in
the United States.139 These subject matter exclusions tend to be
judicially created in the United States, as seen above.140 However, courts in the U.K. tend to construe these restrictions
more narrowly in light of the policy behind patents.141
The case of Shopalotto.com is an instructive starting point on
how courts treat the patentability of software in the U.K. The
patent at issue in Shopalotto involved “a computer apparatus
configured to provide a lottery playable over the [I]nternet.”142
In that case, Justice Pumfrey provided a general overview of
the “technical contribution” requirement that may elevate a
patent from a computer program “as such” to patentable software.143 According to Justice Pumfrey, “an invention may be
viewed as a solution to a concrete technical problem.”144 However, “[m]erely to program a computer so that it operates in a
new way is not a solution to any technical problem . . . . It fol135. Emir Aly Crowne-Mohammed, A Review of the ‘As Such’ Exclusions to
Patentable Subject Matter in the United Kingdom: Lessons for Canadian and
American Courts, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 457, 462 (2010).
136. Alexandra K. Pechhold, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Equivalents in
the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 411, 423 (2005).
137. Crowne-Mohammed, supra note 135, at 462; HTC Europe Co. LTD v.
Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [99].
138. Patents Act 1977, c. 37, § 1(2)(c) (Eng).
139. Crowne-Mohammed, supra note 135, at 462.
140. Jeff Thruston, Echoes from the Past: How the Federal Circuit Continues to Struggle with Patentable Subject Matter Post-Bilski Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011)., 77 MO. L.
REV. 591, 595 (2012).
141. Crowne-Mohammed, supra note 135, at 462.
142. Shopalotto.com, [2005] EWHC (Pat) 2416, [1].
143. Id. at [11].
144. Id.
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lows that an inventive contribution cannot reside in excluded
subject matter.”145 Under this test, for a computer program to
be patentable it must either produce an effect outside of the
computer or solve a technical problem within the computer.146
Another case, Fujitsu Ltd.’s Patent Application, demonstrates
an instance where the U.K. courts deemed software unpatentable as a computer program “as such.” In that case, the Court
of Appeals of England and Wales considered a patent application for a computer program capable of producing models of
crystalline structures in place of plastic models.147 The court
found that the invention was merely an implementation of a
mental act through the use of software, and therefore was not
patentable subject matter because it lacked a significant
enough technical contribution.148 The court adopted the Examiner’s view of the invention as “simply a conventional computer
programmed to display the same images as were previously
produced using plastic models,” and therefore the invention
“[did] not involve a technical advance of the kind” necessary to
constitute patentable subject matter.149 This reflects that the
technical contribution of software must be outside of the program itself and cannot be tied to a mental process.
Finally, in Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., the England
and Wales Court of Appeal proposed a four-part test to determine if computer software falls within patentable subject matter.150 The steps of the test are “1) properly construe the claim;
2) identify the actual contribution; 3) ask whether it falls solely
within the excluded subject matter; and 4) check whether the
actual or alleged contribution is actually technical in nature.”151 In AT&T Knowledge Ventures LP, the court laid out
“useful signposts” to help determine whether software contained a “technical effect” of the type envisioned in Aerotel that
rendered software patentable.152 The “signposts” ask:

145. Id.
146. Crowne-Mohammed, supra note 135, at 473–74.
147. In the matter of Application No. 9204959:2 by Fujitsu Limited, [1997]
RPC 608, [1997] EWCA (Civ) 1174.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Aerotel Ltd. v. Telco Holdings Ltd., [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1371, [40].
151. Id.
152. AT&T Knowledge Ventures LP, Re [2009] EWHC (Pat) 343, [40].
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1) whether the claimed technical effect has a technical effect
on a process which is carried on outside the computer; 2)
whether the claimed technical effect operates at the level of
the architecture of the computer; that is to say whether the
effect is produced irrespective of the data being processed or
the applications being run; 3) whether the claimed technical
effect results in the computer being made to operate in a new
way; 4) whether there is an increase in the speed or reliability
of the computer; 5) whether the perceived problem is overcome by the claimed invention as opposed to merely being circumvented.153

The Aerotel test is now the starting point for determining subject matter eligibility under subsection 1(2) of the U.K. Patent
Act.154
III. THE FAILURE OF TRIPS TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON THE
GLOBAL APPLE-ANDROID PATENT DISPUTE
As discussed above in Parts II.B and II.C, courts in the United States and the U.K. came to very different results when
looking at similar cases on the patentability of software. This
section will compare the results of two cases: Apple v. Samsung
in the United States,155 and HTC v. Apple in the U.K.156 The
analysis will focus on two Apple patents157 covering Apple’s
“multi-touch” feature found in iOS.158 It will show that despite
the similarity of these patents, the courts came to opposite conclusions. Part IV will then suggest changes to TRIPs to prevent
such disparate results; including clarifying that software is patentable subject matter, while reducing the mandated patent

153. Id. at [41].
154. Crowne-Mohammed, supra note 135, at 475.
155. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 24, 2012).
156. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789.
157. The patents referred to cover similar aspects of multi-touch input. One
is filed with the USPTO, and one with the European Patent Office (“EPO”).
The U.S. Patent is U.S. Patent No. 7,844,915 (filed Jan. 7, 2007). The European patent is European Patent No. 2098948 (filed Apr. 3, 2009), referred to
as “the ‘948 patent.”
158. “Multi-touch” allows a user to control a computing device via touch
screen with more than one finger. Multitouch Definition, PCMAG.COM,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,1237,t=multitouch&i=59067,00.a
sp (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
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term for software based on practical considerations of the software market and software itself.
A. Multi-touch in U.S. Courts and the USPTO: Valuable, but
Nothing New
The Apple v. Samsung lawsuit in San Jose, California ended
in a jury verdict that was an enormous victory for Apple—the
company was awarded over one billion dollars when the jury
determined that Samsung had infringed on several of Apple’s
patents.159 The validity of the ‘915 patent was also vindicated.160 The jury found that only three of the twenty-four devices
at issue in the case did not infringe upon the ‘915 patent.161 To
reach this conclusion, the jury was asked to engage in a multipart analysis.162 First, the jury was asked to answer whether
each Samsung device directly infringed163 on the ‘915 patent
through either “literal infringement”164 or infringement under
the “doctrine of equivalents.”165 Next, the jury had to consider
whether the ‘915 patent was invalid under a clear and convinc159. Jessica E. Vascellaro, Apple Wins Big in Patent Case, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
25,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444358404577609810658082
898.html.
160. Verdict Form, supra note 62, at 9.
161. Id. at 3.
162. See Final Jury Instructions, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,
No. 11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Jury Instructions].
163. Id. at 38–40.
164. A product was deemed to be literally infringing if every requirement of
a patent claim was included in the product. Id. at 39. Apple asserted that
Samsung infringed upon claim 8 of the ‘915 patent at trial. Florian Mueller,
Apple Insists That Samsung’s Purported Workaround Still Infringes Pinch-toPATENTS
(Nov.
27,
2012),
Zoom
API
Patent,
FOSS
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/11/apple-insists-that-samsungsalleged.html. This claim covered distinguishing between a single finger and
multiple fingers on a touchscreen. If a single finger is detected, the device will
perform a scroll operation. If multiple fingers are detected, the device will
“scal[e] the view” (zoom in or out). U.S. Patent No. 7,844,915 (filed Jan. 7,
2007).
165. A product was deemed to infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if
it “include[ed] parts or software instructions that [were] identical to the requirements of the claim.” A feature was deemed to be equivalent if “a person
of ordinary skill in the field would think that the differences between the part
or software instructions and the requirement were not substantial at the
time of the alleged infringement.” Jury Instructions, supra note 162, at 40.
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ing evidence standard.166 The jury could invalidate the patent if
it lacked an adequate written description, if it was not new due
to prior art,167 if it fell under a statutory bar, or if it was “obvious.”168 Finally, the jury was asked to calculate damages based
on lost profits, lost market share, and any reasonable royalties
owed to Apple by Samsung.169
The jury agreed with Apple that the ‘915 patent was valid170
and had been infringed by Samsung.171 This was a boon to Apple—Apple considered the ‘915 patent to be the most valuable
multi-touch patent that it was asserting at trial based upon the
royalties that it was demanding from Samsung.172 The verdict
form asked the jury to break down damages by infringing device, and not by patent, so it is unclear how much value the jury placed on the ‘915 patent.173 However, the total damage
award was $1,049,343,540.174
Samsung had argued in its trial brief that the ‘915 patent
was not invalid, not on subject matter grounds, but because
other multi-touch inventions constituted prior art.175 The jury
disagreed with Samsung’s argument, as it found the ‘915 patent to be valid,176 even though it had the option to rule the patent invalid on these grounds.177 However, the USPTO later
agreed with Samsung’s position.178 In an ex parte reexamination hearing, the USPTO found that all twenty-one claims of
the ‘915 patent were invalid due to other multi-touch patents
166. Id. at 42.
167. Prior art constitutes devices, methods, publications, or patents that
predate the patent at issue and contain all of its claim’s requirements. Id. at
44.
168. Id. at 43–47.
169. Id. at 50–56.
170. Verdict Form, supra note 62, at 9.
171. Id. at 3.
172. Apple demanded $3.10 per unit utilizing the ‘915 patent, compared to
$2.02 for the two other multi-touch utility patents that it asserted at trial.
Florian Mueller, Tentatively Invalid: The Most Valuable Multitouch Patent
Asserted by Apple at Samsung Trial, FOSS PATENTS (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/12/tentatively-invalid-most-valuable.html.
173. Verdict Form, supra note 62, at 16.
174. Id. at 15.
175. Samsung’s Trial Brief at 8, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No.
11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012).
176. Verdict Form, supra note 62, at 9.
177. Jury Instructions, supra note 162, at 44.
178. Mueller, supra note 172.
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that constituted prior art.179 The USPTO cited U.S. Patent No.
7,724,242, a Japanese patent, and a 1991 academic paper as
the prior art references.180 The ruling is only preliminary—
Apple will still have the opportunity to challenge the USPTO’s
findings.181
Two things are clear from looking at the ‘915 patent’s experience in the U.S. courts and at the USPTO. First, if valid, the
patent is extremely valuable. Apple believed that the ‘915 patent was its most valuable multi-touch patent in its case
against Samsung, and the multi-touch patent contributed to
one of the largest jury verdicts in patent litigation history.182
Second, even if the patent is invalid on prior art grounds, Samsung’s failure to raise the prior art issue suggests that the patent is likely patentable subject matter.183 Since the ruling is
only preliminary, the USPTO may well still find that the ‘915
patent is valid.184
B. Multi-touch in the U.K.: Not Even Patentable
Apple’s European pinch-to-zoom patent had a very different
experience in the U.K. The patent at issue in the HTC case was
slightly different than the one litigated in the Samsung case.
The patent covered software capable of distinguishing between
single and multiple touches, however it also allowed individual
applications to use “flags” to indicate to the operating system
that multiple touches should be ignored if they were unneces179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Bryan Bishop, Another Apple Patent Rejected by US Patent Office, but
Its Fate Is Far from Certain, VERGE (Dec. 19, 2012, 5:48 PM),
http://www.theverge.com/2012/12/19/3785788/another-apple-patent-rejectedby-us-patent-office-but-its-not-invalid-yet.
182. Schubarth, supra note 2.
183. Samsung initially raised a defense arguing that the ‘915 patent was
not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in its Answer. Samsung
Entities’ Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims to Apple Inc.’s
Amended Complaint; and Demand for Jury Trial at 29, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Samsung Answer]. When Samsung moved for summary judgment,
however, it dropped this argument and instead only argued that its devices
did not infringe on the ‘915 patent. Order Denying Motion for Summary
Judgment at 22, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., No. 11-CV-01846LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Summary Judgment Order]. This
strategy will be discussed in greater detail in Part III.C.
184. Bishop, supra note 181.
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sary.185 This approach was advantageous because software development could be more costly and complex if all applications
were required to process multiple touches.186 While this patent
is somewhat different from the ‘915 patent asserted in Apple v.
Samsung, they are largely similar, as both patents differentiate between single and multiple touches and direct the operating system to perform a function after detecting multiple
touches.187 Apple contended that an Android feature used in
HTC phones used a similar flag process, thus violating Apple’s
patent.188
In analyzing whether this method was patentable, the HTC
court applied the Aerotel test and the AT&T Knowledge Ventures “signposts” to determine whether there was a “technical
effect” within the meaning of Aerotel.189 Apple’s counsel contended that the invention met all of the AT&T Knowledge Ventures “signposts” for five reasons. First, the patent simplified
software programming, a technical effect “outside the computer.”190 Second, the invention “operated at the level of the architecture of the computer” because it was incorporated into the
operating system.191 Third, the invention resulted in the computer operating in a new way by providing a new set of application programming interfaces192 that allowed software developers to send touch events selectively.193 Fourth, the invention
185. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [36]–
[37].
186. European Patent No. 2098948 (filed Apr. 3, 2009).
187. Claim 8 of the ‘915 patent, the claim asserted at trial, distinguishes
between single and multiple-point touches, interpreting single-point touches
as a scroll command and multiple-point touches as a gesture command. U.S.
Patent No. 7,844,915 (filed Jan. 7, 2007). The ‘948 patent at issue in the U.K.
can distinguish between single and multiple touches, and allow applications
to ignore multiple touches until the first touch is finished in order to eliminate conflicting commands. European Patent No. 2098948 (filed Apr. 3,
2009).
188. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [56].
189. Id. at [13], [17].
190. Id. at [92].
191. Id.
192. An “application programming interface,” or API, is a command set that
“allows programmers to use predefined functions . . . instead of writing them
from scratch,” making programming easier. API (Application Programming
Interface)
Definition,
TECHTERMS.COM,
http://www.techterms.com/definition/api (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
193. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [92].
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increased speed and reliability because it simplified application
coding.194 Finally, the invention solved the problem that it was
purported to address.195
The court rejected all of Apple’s arguments and first reverted
to the Aerotel test by asking what the invention’s contributions
were and whether they were “wholly within excluded subject
matter.”196 The court found that software “which processes the
multi-touch input” was “plainly excluded subject matter.”197 So
too was any contribution that made writing software easier, as
“[t]he writing of programs for computers . . . fall[s] squarely
within the exclusion of computer programs as such.”198
The court then analyzed whether there was a relevant technical effect as Apple claimed.199 It concluded that ease of writing software could not be a relevant technical effect, as writing
software was excluded, and increased ease “merely . . . redistribut[es] . . . the labour.”200 Additionally, Apple’s valid assertion that the invention operated at the operating system
level was insufficient because the patent only concerned operation on data in the form of touch events.201 Next, the new APIs
did not cause the computer to work in a new way, as the invention “merely . . . redistribute[ed] . . . data processing within the
device.”202 Finally, there was no evidence of an increase of
speed or reliability, and the fact that the invention solved a
problem was irrelevant “where the problem solved [was] entirely within the computer.”203 Accordingly, the court found that
the invention was not patentable, as it was a “computer program as such.”204
The results of the HTC v. Apple case illustrate the differences
of the U.K.’s approach to software patentability in comparison
to the United States. The court was very skeptical of Apple’s
claims, rejecting every argument Apple made that the contri-

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id. at [93].
Id. at [94].
Id.
Id. at [95].
Id.
Id. at [96].
Id. at [97].
Id. at [98].
Id. at [99].
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bution of its ‘948 patent was “technical in nature.”205 In the
end, the ‘948 patent was ruled to be invalid as non-patentable
subject matter.206 Three other patents were asserted against
HTC, each of which was found to be either invalid for obviousness or in light of prior art, or not infringed by HTC.207 This
stands in stark contrast to Apple v. Samsung, where Apple’s
similar ‘915 patent was found to be valid and infringed.208
C. Reconciling the Disparate Results Reached in the United
States and the U.K.
The disparate results reached in Apple v. Samsung and HTC
v. Apple are in part due to the different approaches that the
United States and the U.K. use to evaluate the patentability of
software. Although the Apple v. Samsung court did not reach
the issue of whether the ‘915 patent constituted patentable
subject matter, this was because Samsung had dropped that
argument. Samsung did assert an excluded subject matter defense in its initial answer to Apple’s amended complaint.209
However, when Samsung moved for summary judgment, it instead argued that its devices did not infringe upon the ‘915 patent.210 Presumably, Samsung would have argued that the ‘915
patent was ineligible subject matter in this motion if it felt that
this was a strong claim, as a successful summary judgment motion on these grounds can rule a patent invalid.211 This would
have eliminated the need for Samsung to defend against the
‘915 patent at trial. Instead, it argued—unsuccessfully—that
its devices did not infringe on the ‘915 patent.212 Samsung’s refusal to bring such a powerful defense suggests that Samsung
itself thought that the ‘915 patent would be found valid under
the U.S. standard.

205. Id. at [93].
206. Id. at [363].
207. Id.
208. Verdict Form, supra note 62, at 3, 9.
209. Samsung Answer, supra note 183, at 29.
210. Summary Judgment Order, supra note 183, at 22.
211. See SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 852 F.Supp.2d
42, 66 (D.D.C. 2012), reconsideration denied, Civ. A. No. 08-00642 BAH, 2013
WL 40321 (D.D.C. Jan. 3, 2013), reconsideration denied, 915 F. Supp. 2d 69
(D.D.C. 2013) (invalidating a patent as ineligible subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101 on a motion for partial summary judgment).
212. See Summary Judgment Order, supra note 183, at 22.
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By contrast, HTC was able to render Apple’s ‘948 patent invalid in the U.K. by challenging whether it was patentable subject matter in the first place.213 The fact that this multi-touch
patent, similar to the one asserted in Apple v. Samsung, was
rendered invalid illustrates the narrower view that the U.K.
takes toward software patentability discussed above.214 In fact,
the court’s reasoning suggested that the U.S. patent might not
be patentable in the U.K., as it found that “the software which
processes the multi-touch input . . . is plainly excluded subject
matter.”215 Additionally, HTC argued that the other three Apple patents asserted at trial were excluded subject matter.216
This shows that the differing legal standards impacted HTC
and Samsung’s trial strategies, as HTC repeatedly asserted
that Apple’s software patents were invalid, while Samsung declined to even bring the argument in its summary judgment
motion.217 The fact that such disparate legal standards, legal
strategies, and results can be seen in two countries that are
both signatories to TRIPs demonstrates that the treaty has not
provided much guidance on what is patentable in the field of
software.
IV. MODIFYING TRIPS TO PROVIDE FOR INCREASED
COMPETITION IN THE FIELDS OF SOFTWARE AND CONSUMER
ELECTRONICS
As demonstrated above, the TRIPs Agreement is vague as it
applies to software, both in terms of whether it applies to software and what it requires for software to be patentable.218 This
has fostered great differences in the legal standards that its
signatories have adopted for software patentability, leading to
uncertainty in international patent litigation and influencing
the legal strategies adopted by litigants.219 Additionally, the
fast-moving nature of the software and consumer electronics
markets raises concerns that the blanket twenty-year mini213. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [363].
214. See supra Part II.C.
215. HTC Europe Co. LTD v. Apple Inc., [2012] EWHC (Pat) 1789, [94].
216. Id. at [238], [280], [358].
217. See Summary Judgment Order, supra note 183, at 17–18 (addressing
Samsung’s sole summary judgment claim of non-infringement, with no discussion of excluded subject matter).
218. See supra Part II.A.
219. See supra Part III.
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mum patent term under TRIPs overprotects software and restricts competition decades after a patent is granted.220 This
Note offers two solutions. First, TRIPs should be modified to
explicitly state that software is patentable subject matter and
to clarify what qualifies as a “new . . . inventive step . . . capable of industrial application” under Article 27.221 Second, the
minimum patent term for software under TRIPs should be reduced from twenty years to five years, allowing signatories to
adopt patent terms that better reflect market realities. These
changes would aid consumer electronics product development
by increasing the predictability of global software patentability,
and increase competition by allowing signatories to deny monopolies that extend far beyond the scope and product life of
the original invention.
A. TRIPs Should be Modified to Clarify that Software is Patentable Subject Matter, with a Clear Standard Readily
Adoptable by Legislatures
The lack of clarity on software patentability is one of the chief
failures of TRIPs that must be addressed. Conflicting language
in Article 27 of TRIPs has left it unclear whether “pure” software with no physical manifestation is patentable, and what
standard of patentability should be adopted for software.222 The
ambiguity of Article 27 has therefore left these questions largely up to signatory countries.223 The differences that result are
clearly illustrated in the differences between the U.S. and U.K.
approaches to patent law, as discussed in Parts II.B and II.C.
This ambiguity has disadvantages that harm the global markets for software and consumer electronics. The varying legal
standards for software patentability can lead to disparate results in patent litigation, as seen in the Apple v. Samsung and
HTC v. Apple cases. The prospect of disparate results can set
off global patent battles of the type seen here; invalidation or
enforcement in one country may just prompt further litigation

220. Note, Computer Intellectual Property and Conceptual Severance, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1046, 1062 (1990).
221. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 25, art. 27.
222. Charfoos, supra note 82, at 281–82.
223. Id. at 282.
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in another.224 This unpredictability increases the costs of patent litigation by requiring patent holders and defendants to
prepare for litigation under a dizzying number of legal standards.225 Often, the only entities that can bear the high costs of
international patent litigation are large corporations, placing
new inventors and startup companies at a disadvantage.226
These issues demonstrate the toll that the current ambiguity of
software patentability has taken on global markets by complicating the process of marketing software and consumer electronics globally.227
TRIPs should therefore be modified to explicitly state that
software is patentable subject matter. Further, it should allow
patents on “pure software,” without effects external to the computer, provided that it meets the remaining requirements under TRIPs. Software is certainly a “field of technology,” as required under Article 27 of TRIPs;228 the question is if it is incapable of “industrial application” absent some effect external to
the software itself.229 Some speculate that TRIPs did not adopt
“pure software” patents because diverging views precluded
them.230 But even countries with narrow patent regimes, like
the U.K., allow “pure software” patents in some instances.231 A
more unified global standard will provide numerous advantages to software and consumer electronics firms by increasing incentives to invent while protecting software developers globally.232 Additionally, a clear standard for software
patentability will increase predictability in the international
224. John R. Thomas, Litigation Beyond the Technological Frontier: Comparative Approaches to Multinational Patent Enforcement, 27 LAW & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 277, 291 (1996).
225. Dongwook Chun, Patent Law Harmonization in the Age of Globalization: The Necessity and Strategy for a Pragmatic Outcome, 93 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 127, 136–37 (2011).
226. Thomas, supra note 224, at 291.
227. Chun, supra note 225, at 136–37.
228. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 25, art. 27.
229. Charfoos, supra note 82, at 281.
230. Id.
231. See AT&T Knowledge Ventures LP, Re [2009] EWHC (Pat) 343, [40]
(finding software may be patentable subject matter where, among other
things, it “results in the computer operating in a new way” or “increase[s] . . .
the speed or reliability of the computer”).
232. Robert R. Willis, International Patent Law: Should United States and
Foreign Patent Laws Be Uniform? An Analysis of the Benefits, Problems, and
Barriers, 10 N.C.J. L. & TECH. 283, 300 (2009).
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patent system.233 In turn, greater predictability will reduce the
cost of global patent litigation234 and allow software firms to
better focus their research and development.235 In sum, modifying TRIPs to clarify the legal standard for software patentability would help foster innovation in the field while saving vast
sums on litigation that could instead be spent on research and
development.
B. TRIPs Should Reduce the Minimum Patent Term for Software to Accommodate the Unique Attributes of the Software and
Consumer Electronics Industries
While clarifying TRIPs to allow for “pure software” patents
would have numerous advantages, it would also substantially
broaden the scope of patentability. This creates additional
problems, as broad standards for software patentability have
contributed to the massive proliferation of software patents.236
This proliferation creates “patent thickets” that must be
“hacked” through by competitors before a product can be commercialized, creating significant barriers to entry.237 As more
patents for software are issued, it becomes increasingly likely
that a new product will accidently infringe upon a patent.238
This can be particularly problematic in the smartphone industry, as the average smartphone implicates approximately
200,000 patents.239 Further, large companies frequently amass
software patents not for use in an invention, but to obtain bet-

233. Erwin F. Berrier, Jr., Global Patent Costs Must Be Reduced, 36 IDEA
473, 479–80 (1996).
234. Willis, supra note 232, at 300.
235. Chun, supra note 225, at 136.
236. Robert A. Migliorini, The Narrowed Experimental Use Exception to
Patent Infringement and Its Application to Patented Computer Software, 88 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 523, 525 (2006).
237. David A. Balto & Andrew M. Wolman, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: General Principles, 43 IDEA 395, 473 (2003).
238. Kirk D. Rowe, Why Pay for What’s Free?: Minimizing the Patent Threat
to Free and Open Source Software, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 595,
604 n.79 (2008).
239. The Android Patent War, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204826704577074523539966
352.html.
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ter bargaining positions in cross-licensing negotiations.240 The
massive proliferation of software patents puts small firms and
startups at a serious disadvantage, as it costs on average over
one million dollars to challenge a patent.241
Many of these problems could be solved if the patent period
for software was significantly reduced to five years, lessening
the incentive to amass patents.242 However, TRIPs currently
stands as a barrier to such action, as the treaty mandates a
twenty-year minimum patent period regardless of the field of
technology.243 TRIPs should therefore be modified to create an
exception for software, reducing the minimum patent term to
five years. There are significant differences in the software industry that counsel such an approach. While some industries,
like pharmaceuticals, require long patent periods to allow firms
to recoup research costs, software development is relatively
cheap.244 Additionally, software has a very short “shelf life,” as
advances in the field typically render a patent obsolete before
the term even expires.245 Software is also designed by using existing algorithms to perform new functions in a “building block”
approach.246 Preventing these algorithms from entering the
public domain harms innovation by preventing new developers
from using these tools to improve upon the basic building
blocks of the industry.247 Therefore, modifying TRIPs to allow
for a shorter patent term would improve innovation by allowing
the necessary tools for development to enter the public domain
earlier.

240. David S. Evans & Anne Layne-Farrar, Software Patents and Open
Source: The Battle over Intellectual Property Rights, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 10, 54
(2004).
241. James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/20000312mag-patents.html.
242. See James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex
Technologies, at 10 n.13 (Working Paper Series, March 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=327760.
243. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 25, art. 27.
244. Rowe, supra note 238, at 607–08.
245. Allen Clark Zoracki, When Is an Algorithm Invented? The Need for a
New Paradigm for Evaluating an Algorithm for Intellectual Property Protection, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 579, 594-95 (2005).
246. Rowe, supra note 238, at 607.
247. Zoracki, supra note 245, at 595.
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CONCLUSION
While the TRIPs regime was a landmark development in
global intellectual property rights and patent harmonization, it
was drafted while the consumer software industry was in a
state of relative infancy. Since it was adopted, software and
consumer electronics have become one of the most important
industries for global trade and technological development.
TRIPs should therefore be revisited to reflect this reality by
clarifying the level of protection that software receives, while
reducing its patent term to bring more software into the public
domain and encourage innovation. This will not be an easy
task—TRIPs took over seven years of negotiations to be passed
in its current form.248 However, the ambiguous status of the
global patent system illustrated by the recent Apple-Android
patent war demonstrates that action must be taken. With some
effort, a system can be adopted that serves the software and
consumer electronics industries rather than hindering them.
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